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Abstract—It is well-known that malware constantly evolves
so as to evade detection and this causes the entire malware
population to be non-stationary. Contrary to this fact, prior
works on machine learning based Android malware detection
have assumed that the distribution of the observed malware
characteristics (i.e., features) do not change over time. In this
work, we address the problem of malware population drift and
propose a novel online machine learning based framework,
named DroidOL to handle it and effectively detect malware.
In order to perform accurate detection, the security-sensitive
behaviors are captured from apps in the form of inter-procedural
control-flow sub-graph features using a state-of-the-art graph
kernel. In order to perform scalable detection and to adapt to
the drift and evolution in malware population, an online passive-
aggressive classifier is used.
In a large-scale comparative analysis with more than 87,000
apps, DroidOL achieves 84.29% accuracy outperforming two
state-of-the-art malware techniques by more than 20% in their
typical batch learning setting and more than 3% when they
are continuously re-trained. Our experimental findings strongly
indicate that online learning based approaches are highly suitable
for real-world malware detection.
keywords — Online Learning, Graph Kernels, Malware
Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, malware detection for mobile platforms such
Android has evolved as one of the challenging problems in the
field of cyber-security. The number of new Android malware
applications (apps for short) and their capabilities have grown
tremendously in recent years. For instance, Kaspersky reports
[1] detecting 4 million malware infections in 2015 which is
a 216% increase over 2014. The sheer volume and growth
rate of Android malware highlights an imperative need for
developing sound and scalable automated malware detection
process [2]–[7, 12].
Malware detection using Machine Learning (ML) tech-
niques is predominant in various platforms (such as Windows,
Android and the web) for more than a decade [2]–[7, 12]. This
is because, these methods automatically learn the characteris-
tics that distinguish malware, when trained using a collection
of malware and benign samples making them amenable for
automated detection. ML based approaches extract features
from an apps’ behaviors and apply standard ML algorithms
to perform binary classification. These approaches typically
use semantic features such as system calls/Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) invoked, resources and privileges
used, control- and data-flows inside apps’ execution to detect
malicious behavior patterns [2]–[7, 12].
Most of these malware detection techniques are based on
batch-learning classifiers. Meaning, the detection model is
built using a batch of labelled benign and malware samples and
is subsequently used to predict whether a given new sample is
benign or malicious. These batch-learning based methods are
typically plagued by two challenges that make them unsuitable
for real-world large-scale malware detection:
• Population drift. Though batch-learning based solutions
are promising, their success is predicated on an important
assumption that may not hold for the malware detection
problem. That is, they assume that the malware population
(i.e., training data) used to build the detection model does
not change over time. However, malware does not fit this
profile. The entire population of malware is constantly
evolving due to various reasons such as exploiting new
vulnerabilities, and evading novel detection techniques. This
evolution has a profound impact on malware characteristics
and thereby on malware features. This makes the collection
of malware identified today not a representative of the ones
generated in the future. This phenomenon is an epitome of
population drift [17]. Since new malware features emerge
and importances of features change over time, this popula-
tion drift leads to concept drift [17, 18].
• Volume. As noted before, malware grows at an alarming rate
and hence a scalable classifier is of paramount importance
to practical large-scale malware detection. In order to keep
abreast with drifting population, batch learners have to be
frequently re-trained with huge volumes of data. Hence they
pose severe scalability issues when used in the Android mal-
ware detection context where we have millions of samples
already and thousands streaming in every day. Retraining
frequently with such a volume renders them computationally
impractical.
Our Approach. We take these two challenges into consider-
ation and propose DroidOL, an accurate, adaptive and scalable
malware detection framework based on online learning, where
we continuously retrain the model upon receiving each labeled
sample and make prediction of a new sample using the updated
model. We demonstrate that online learning based solutions
are better suited for practical large-scale automated malware
detection for two reasons:
• The detection model needs to adapt to changes in malware
features over time, automatically.
• Online learning based solution can process large numbers
of apps more efficiently than batch methods.
DroidOL’s achieves superior accuracy through extracting
high quality features from inter-procedural control-flow graphs
(ICFGs) of apps, which are known to be robust against evasion
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and obfuscation techniques adopted by malware [2, 5]. To this
end, we use the Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) graph kernel [13]
that supports explicit feature vector representation of graphs to
extract semantic features from ICFGs. DroidOL’s adaptiveness
and scalability are achieved through use of online learning.
Hence, the primary contribution of our paper is the success-
ful application of online learning algorithms to the problem of
Android malware detection. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to propose such a framework and demonstrate its
capabilities to handle population drift.
Experiments. DroidOL is evaluated through large-scale
experiments on a recent real-world dataset of more than
87,000 apps. It is compared against two state-of-the-art
batch-learning based Android malware detection techniques.
DroidOL achieves 84.29% accuracy outperforming state-of-
the-art techniques by more than 24% in their typical batch-
learning and more than 3% when they are re-trained. Sub-
sequently, we show that continuous retraining over newly
emerging features is crucial for adapting the detection model
to detect new or evolving malware.
In summary, our paper’s contributions are as follows:
• We propose and develop DroidOL, an accurate, scalable and
adaptive Android malware detection framework which is
based on online learning, where we do not assume that the
malware population is stationary (in §III).
• We conduct and report a large-scale comparative analysis
of our framework against several re-trained variants of two
state-of-the-art malware detection solutions on a sizable
dataset of more than 87,000 apps (in §VI and VII).
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing
the related works on malware detection and also present our
motivations in §II. The DroidOL framework is introduced in
§III. Implementation details are discussed in §IV. DroidOL’s
evaluation, comparative analysis and relevant discussions are
presented in sections V, VI and VII. Conclusions are presented
in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK & MOTIVATION
ML based approaches are popular over the past decade for
malware detection. Many existing works have successfully
applied ML techniques for malware detection on various
platforms such as Windows, Android and the web.
A. Related Work - Android Malware Detection
1) Primitive Approaches: In the case of Android, Crow-
droid [11], Drebin [4] and DroidAPIMiner [8] are noticeable
among the early approaches on ML based malware detection.
These methods were designed to detect malware operating
on the initial versions of Android, performing simpler attacks
such as making premium-rated calls/SMS. Hence, they lever-
aged on primitive features such as system calls, Android APIs
and permissions. These techniques detect malware through
identifying suspicious usage patterns of the aforesaid features.
In particular, Crowdroid [11] uses Linux system call sequences
as features. Drebin [4] uses APIs, permissions, components,
accessed URLs and Intent filters as features. DroidAPIMiner
[8] considers sensitive APIs along with parameters and pack-
age level information as features. Even though these features
are good enough for detecting simpler malware, they are easily
evaded by modern malware that perform sophisticated attacks
[7, 9].
2) Robust Approaches: In order to detect stealthy malware,
recent approaches leverage on two type of detection: (1)
information-flow based detection and (2) graph based struc-
tural detection.
Information-flow based detection. These methods track
the flow of sensitive information inside the apps’ execution
and detect malware by spotting suspicious flows. Even though
these methods are highly precise, they exhibit poor scalability
due to the expensive data-flow analysis they leverage on.
Hence such methods are not suitable for practical large-scale
malware detection [3, 4]. Mudflow [10], is a prototypical
example of these types of detection methods.
Graph based structural detection. Graphs offer a natural
way to model the sequence of activities that take place in
a program. Hence they serve as amenable data-structures
for detecting malware through identifying suspicious activity
sequences. For this reason, graph representations such as call-
graphs, control- and data-flow graphs, control-, data- and
program-dependency graphs have been widely used for mal-
ware detection in conjunction with graph mining techniques
[2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12]. In the case of Android, DroidMiner [9]
and Allix et al. [5] proposed to use control-flow graph based
features to perform structural malware detection. DroidSIFT
[7] and AppContext [2] proposed a more robust approach
by including the contextual information of security-sensitive
activities (i.e., whether or not the user is aware of such an
activity) along with structural information captured through
graphs.
These solutions are plagued by two limitations:
(1) Loss of expressiveness: These solutions follow a naı¨ve
approach to vectorise the graphs such as taking only individual
nodes into consideration without their neighborhood. This
leads to loosing the expressiveness of graphs.
(2) Poor efficiency: Many classic graph mining based ap-
proaches (e.g., [12]) are NP hard and have severe scalabil-
ity issues, making them impractical for real-world malware
detection [3].
Graph Kernels for malware detection. Recently, efficient
and expressive graph kernels such as WL kernel [13] have been
proposed and widely adopted in many application areas (e.g,
bio- and chemo-informatics, computer vision, etc.). Some of
these kernels also support building explicit feature vector rep-
resentations of graphs. Taking notice of such a development,
two approaches, Adagio [3] and Sahs et al. [6] used graph
kernels to perform structural detection of Android malware.
B. Motivation
While all the above mentioned works focus on engineering
robust features that can detect malware effectively, they do
not address a key practical aspect of malware detection prob-
lem—malware evolution. As discussed in §I, many analytical
studies such as [17, 21] have clearly highlighted that malware
evolves in terms of its characteristics for various reasons.
The evolution inevitably leads to profound changes in the
malware features over time i.e., concept drift. This poses two
challenges:
(C1) the detection model has to automatically adapt to the
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Fig. 1: DroidOL framework for performing online learning
based Android malware detection
concept drift.
(C2) the detection model has to consider and account for new
features that emerge over time.
Malware detection as a data-stream classification prob-
lem. While none of the existing Android malware detection
techniques address this concept drift, we get a clear motivation
to do so. While all the existing works consider malware
detection as a static classification problem with a fixed training
and test set, we note that this is against the real-world situation.
Hence, we model it as a data stream classification problem.
As for the two aforementioned challenges, we address the first
challenge (C1) through the use of an online learning classifier
which adapts itself to the drift in characteristics of samples
that stream in and for the second challenge (C2), we use a
dynamic feature space, where the number of features keeps
growing over time (see §VI-C for a detailed explanation).
While we note that there a few approaches in the past that
have adopted online learning to tackle concept drift in malware
for other platforms such as Windows [20], we are the first to
do so for Android.
Features. As discussed in the previous subsection II-A,
graph based features have been proven effective and robust
to several evasion strategies followed by malware and hence
we use them. While choosing a particular graph representation,
we note that building data-flow and data-dependency graphs is
not scalable and call-graphs are too coarse-grained to capture
the program semantics perfectly. Hence, we use ICFG repre-
sentation as they efficiently capture finer program semantics.
Graph Kernel. Since WL graph kernel [13] is the current
state-of-the-art graph kernel, known for its expressiveness and
efficiency, we use it to extract semantic features from ICFGs.
III. DROIDOL - FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
The overview of DroidOL framework which performs ac-
curate, adaptive and scalable malware detection using online
learning is presented in Fig. 1. DroidOL has three phases. We
begin by performing static analysis on a given set of apps to
get their ICFG representations. Subsequently, ICFG subgraph
features are extracted using the WL kernel and the apps are
represented as feature vectors. Finally, an online PA classifier
is trained with these vectors to detect malware. Each of the
phases is described in detail below.
1) Abstraction. Our malware detection approach considers
node-labeled ICFG sub-graphs as features. To extract these
features, we first perform Android-specific static analysis
to transform all the apps into their corresponding ICFG
Algorithm 1 WL kernel — extracting vocabulary for feature
vector representation of ICFGs
Input:
G = {ICFG1, ICFG2, ..., ICFGK}: A set of K ICFGs (one for
each of the K apps in the dataset.)
h: Degree of neighborhood to be considered for label enrichment
Output:
Σ: Vocabulary of sub-graph features present across all graphs in G
1: procedure EXTRACT VOCAB(G, h)
2: Σ← φ
3: for ICFG = (N,E, λ0) ∈ G do
4: for i = 0 to h do
5: for n ∈ N do
6: if i = 0 then
7: λ0(n)← λ(n)
8: else
9: N (n)← {m | (n,m) ∈ E}
10: Mi(n)← {λi−1(m) | m ∈ N (n)}
11: λi(n)← λi−1(n)⊕ sort(Mi(n))
12: end if
13: Σ← Σ ∪ λi(n)
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: return Σ
18: end procedure
representations. Subsequently, the ICFG nodes are labeled
with security sensitive APIs1 that they access. Formally,
ICFG = (N,E, λ) is a directed graph where N is a set
of nodes and each node n ∈ N denotes an instruction in
the disassembled format. E ⊆ (N ×N) is a set of edges
and each edge e(n1, n2) ∈ E denotes the control-flow from
n1 to n2. λ is the set of security-sensitive Android APIs
and ` : N → λ, is a labeling function which assigns an
API as label to each node.
2) Feature Extraction & Representation. Once the ICFGs
are constructed, (rooted) sub-graphs in these ICFGs that
represent the security-sensitive behaviors in every app are
extracted using the WL graph kernel [13]. Subsequently,
ICFGs are represented as feature vectors.
WL kernel. The WL kernel works by augmenting the
labels of every node n with its neighborhood (up to a
certain degree) in a given graph, G. The frequency of
these enriched node labels which denote sub-graphs around
every node in G are used as features to facilitate an explicit
feature vector representation of G.
Thus the process of obtaining feature vector representation
of ICFGs in our dataset using WL kernel involves two
steps: (1) Building a vocabulary, Σ of sub-graph features
present across all ICFGs, (2) Transforming every ICFG into
a feature vector with |Σ| dimensions. Step (1) is presented
in detail in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm Explanation. The inputs to Algorithm 1 are G,
a set of K ICFGs (one for each of the K apps in the
dataset) and h, the degree of sub-graphs to be considered
for feature extraction. The output is a vocabulary set Σ
that contains the unique sub-graphs upto degree h present
1PScout [19], an existing research work identifies and lists the security-
sensitive Android APIs. These APIs are used for labeling our ICFG nodes.
across all ICFGs in G.
In each iteration i of the algorithm (lines 4 to 15), the
neighborhood up to degree i around a node n is captured
and condensed in the form of a neighborhood label, λi(n).
These neighborhood label is what we refer to as sub-graph
features. For every ICFGk ∈ G, the following process is
adopted to obtain these neighborhood labels.
For the initial iteration i = 0 no neighborhood information
needs to be considered. Hence the neighborhood label
λ0(n) is same as the original node label λ(n) (line 7).
For i > 0, the following procedure is used for label
enrichment: Firstly, for a node n ∈ N , all of its neighboring
nodes are obtained and stored in N (n) (line 9). For each
node m ∈ N (n) the neighborhood label up to degree
i − 1 is obtained and stored in multiset Mi(n) (line 10).
Subsequently, λi−1(n), neighborhood label of n till degree
i−1 is concatenated to the sorted value of Mi(n) to obtain
the current neighborhood label, λi(n) (line 11). Finally,
the neighborhood label λi(n) representing the ith degree
neighborhood around n is added to the vocabulary of sub-
graph features Σ (line 13).
Once the vocabulary Σ is obtained, we transform every
ICFG ∈ G into its corresponding vector representation
by counting the frequency of every feature from Σ in
ICFGk. This procedure falls under the well-known Bag-
of-Features (BoF) representation model [13], where every
ICFG is considered as a bag of sub-graphs.
3) Online Learning. Once the feature vectors of all the apps
in the training-set are built, we train an online PA clas-
sifier with these vectors to detect malware. PA classifier’s
training and update procedures are as explained below with
relevant notations.
Denote the features of an app (both benign and malware)
as a vector x = [x(1), x(2), ..., x(d)]T , and its label as
y ∈ {−1,+1}, where −1 indicates benign and +1 indi-
cates malicious apps. The PA classifier receives a number
of samples, xi, and their labels, yi, and trains using this
labeled data. Given a new unseen sample, x, the goal of
PA classifier is to predict the label, y, of this new sample
based on its trained model.
PA being a linear classifier fits a linear decision bound-
ary (i.e., hyperplane) between the positive and negative
class samples. That is, the model is a weight vector,
w = [w(1), w(2), ..., w(d)]T which indicates the weight (i.e.
relative importance) of each of the features used to predict
the output label y. The predicted label, yˆ, is the sign of the
inner product between x and w:
yˆ = sign(x · w) (1)
PA incrementally build the models in rounds. In round t,
PA receives a sample, xt and predicts its label yˆt using the
current model; it then receives yt, the true label of xt and
updates its model based on the sample-label pair: (xt, yt),
if it makes a wrong prediction. That is, w is updated if the
predicted label, yˆt and the true label, yt of the sample xt are
not the same. The goal of the PA algorithm is to update the
model w as minimal as possible to correct for any mistakes
it commits. PA solves the following optimization with each
given sample:
wt+1 ← argmin
w
1
2
||wt − w||2 (2)
subject to yi(w · xt) ≥ 1
Updates occur only when yt(wt ·xt) < 1., The closed-form
update for all samples is as follows:
wt+1 ← wt + αtytxt (3)
where αt = max{ 1−yt(wt·xt)||xt||2 , 0} (we refer the reader to
the original work at [15] for this derivation and further
details on PA algorithm).
Once the PA classifier in DroidOL is trained with all
these samples it is ready to perform malware detection at
scale. It is important to note that since DroidOL is trained
in an online fashion, it performs malware detection and
simultaneously adapts to the changing trends in malware
features by retraining on every sample it misclassifies.
Alternatives. As practitioners involved in building an
online malware detection framework, we do not have
any vested interest in a particular algorithm for online
learning. Ultimately, we wish to determine the algorithm
that scales well to problems of our size and yields the
best performance. To that end, we experimented with other
well-known online learning algorithms such as Online
Perceptron (OP) and Stochastic Gradient Descent learning
based Logistic Regression (LRSGD) along with PA. Since
PA offered the best results in terms of accuracy, it is used
in DroidOL. We believe this is because OP and LRSGD do
not imbibe the notion of classification confidence and treat
all misclassifications equally, unlike PA. PA, on the other
hand, updates more aggressively when the margin of error
is large and less aggressively in when it is small. While
we note that evolving classifiers such as pClass [22] could
be used for handling concept drift, we prefer PA over such
methods, as it offers better efficiency.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
We implemented the DroidOL framework in approximately
15,600 lines of Python and Java code. Soot2, a popular
Android static analysis workbench is used for constructing the
ICFGs of the apps in our dataset. Scikit-learn3 toolbox is used
for all our ML functionalities.
We compare our online learning based detection against two
state-of-the-art Android malware detection solutions, namely
Drebin [4] and Allix et. al.’s [5]. It is noted that both these
methods use batch learning classifiers.
Drebin [4] is well-known for its scalable and explainable
detection. It extracts light-weight features such as APIs, per-
missions, URLs accessed, names of components from apps
and subsequently, trains a linear SVM classifier to distinguish
malware from benign apps.
Allix et al. [5] recently proposed another scalable approach
using structural features, namely CFG signatures. Therefore,
we refer to this technique as CFG-Signature Based Detection
(CSBD) in the reminder of the paper. CSBD constructs CFGs
of individual methods and encodes them as text-signatures.
2http://sable.github.io/soot
3http://scikit-learn.org
TABLE I: Dataset with apps dated from Jan 1, 2014 to Aug
13, 2014
Market Name # of Benign Apps # of Malware
Google Play 39156 26178
Anzhi 2957 12260
AppChina 1845 4154
SlideMe 289 132
HiApk 65 157
FDroid 29 2
Angeeks 6 27
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Fig. 2: Timeline based distribution of apps in our large-scale
dataset (with malware and benign apps proportions).
Subsequently, a Random Forest classifier is trained with these
signatures to detect malware.
V. DATA COLLECTION
We evaluate our approach on a recent large-scale real-
world dataset of 87,257 apps collected in-the-wild. These apps
are collected from seven different Android markets4, namely,
Google Play, Anzhi, AppChina, SlideMe, HiApk, FDroid and
Angeeks, in 2014. Following the common practice in software
security research, we use the Virus Total5 web portal which
hosts malware detection services from more than 40 Anti-virus
scanners to determine the ground-truth labels of the apps. We
infer that dataset contained 44,347 benign and 42,910 malware
apps. The composition of the dataset is presented in Table I.
It is noted that this is a subset of a large collection of apps
used in [23].
The date of creation of these apps fall in a span of 224
days starting from 1 Jan’14 to 13 Aug’14. We intend to sort
these apps according to their date of creation and emulate a
live feed of apps to the malware detectors considered in our
experiments to examine how they cope up with the drift in
the malware characteristics over time. To this end, we divide
all the apps in the dataset (both benign and malware) into
batches according to their date of creation. Hence we have
224 batches, one for each day. The resulting time-line based
distribution of the two datasets are presented in Fig. 2.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate DroidOL’s accuracy and adap-
tiveness using the emulated live feed of apps. To this end, we
4Google Play: https://play.google.com/store, Anzhi: www.anzhi.com,
AppChina: www.appchina.com, SlideMe: www.SlideME.org,
HiApk: www.hiapk.com, FDroid: www.fdroid.org and Angeeks:
http://apk.angeeks.com
5https://www.virustotal.com/
address the following questions:
(1) Does DroidOL’s online learning provide any benefit over
batch learning for malware detection?
(2) How does DroidOL’s accuracy compare to light-weight
state-of-the-art malware detection techniques?
(3) Is there a particular training regimen that fully realizes the
potential of online classifier?
A. Advantages of Online Learning
We start by evaluating the benefit of using online over
batch learning for the problem of malware detection in terms
of detection accuracy — in particular, whether the benefit
of DroidOL’s efficiency comes at the expense of accuracy.
Specifically, we compare DroidOL’s PA based classification
against four different training configurations of a canonical
batch learning classifier. We used Linear SVM as our canonical
batch learner. It is noted that evaluations with other batch
algorithms such as logistic regression yielded similar results.
Batch Learning Configurations. For SVM, we experiment
with the following variants: SVM-Once, SVM-Daily, SVM-
MultiOnce, and SVM-MultiDaily. For SVM-Once, SVM clas-
sifier is trained only once on the apps from Day 1 (1 Jan’14).
This model is tested on all other days without retaining. For
SVM-Daily, the classifier is retrained after every day; however,
only one previous day’s samples are used for every retraining
— e.g., 11 Jan’14 results reflect training on the apps created
on 10 Jan’14, and testing on 11 Jan’14 apps. SVM-MultiOnce
is similar to SVM-Once and SVM-MultiDaily is similar to
SVM-Daily, however, with the size of the batch for training
and retraining covers 10 days instead of 1. In summary, for
Once and MultiOnce variants, the model is never re-trained
and for Daily and Multi-Daily, the model is re-trained in a
sliding window fashion over the batches of data. The size of
MultiDaily training sets is determined to be 10-day batches
based on the data that our evaluation machine with 32 GB
RAM can handle.
Figs. 3 (a) shows the cumulative error rates of DroidOL
in comparison to the aforementioned variants of SVM. The
following observations are made from Fig. 3 (a):
• Updating the detection models over time is essential to
detect new malware as shown by SVM-MultiDaily and
SVM-Daily outperforming SVM-MultiOnce and SVM-
Once, respectively.
• Training on significantly more data improves the per-
formance, as illustrated by SVM-MultiDaily and SVM-
MultiOnce outperforming SVM-Daily and SVM-Once,
respectively. However, it is noted that there is a fun-
damental limit on the amount of data a batch-learning
technique could train on because of the storage, memory
and time requirements.
• Third, DroidOL consistently outperforms all the batch
learnt variants. In particular, it outperforms the best re-
trained variant of SVM by more than 4% cumulative error
rate. This is because DroidOL is able to adapt to the
changes in the malware characteristics instantaneously as
well as retain significantly useful information from the
past.
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Fig. 3: Cumulative error rates for DroidOL vs. batch learning algorithms (a) DroidOL Vs. four variants of SVM (b) DroidOL
Vs. four variants of Drebin (c) DroidOL Vs. four variants of CSBD.
B. Comparison with state-of-the-art Malware Detectors
The above-mentioned SVM variants use the same features
as DroidOL and hence it is sufficient to compare online
and batch learning paradigms. However, this does not reflect
the significance of DroidOL as a practical malware detector
in the context of current state-of-the-art malware detection
techniques. In order to study this, we compare DroidOL with
two state-of-the-art malware detectors, namely, Drebin [4] and
CSBD [5].
For this comparison, we follow the same batch learning
configurations described in §VI-A to arrive at the four variants
of these techniques: Drebin/CSBD-Once, Drebin/CSBD-Daily,
Drebin/CSBD-MultiOnce and Drebin/CSBD-MultiDaily.
The results of this comparison are presented in Fig 3 (b)
and (c). From these figures we make the following inferences:
• For both these methods, the trends in performance of all
four variants are similar to those of the SVM variants.
Hence the observations made in §VI-A on frequently up-
dating the models and training with more data, hold. The
error rates of best-performing variants of these methods
are comparable to that of SVM-MultiDaily.
• DroidOL consistently outperforms the best performing
variants of both the methods. Particularly, it outper-
forms Drebin-MultiDaily by more than 5% and CSBD-
MultiDaily by more than 3%. This reaffirms the suitabil-
ity of online learning for practical large-scale malware
detection.
C. Training Regimen
Since DroidOL’s feature extraction using WL kernel is
based on BoF model, our number of features grows as the
samples stream in. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative number of
features for each day of the evaluations in our dataset, rep-
resenting the feature space growth. Each day’s total includes
new features introduced that day and all the old features from
previous days. We obtained a total of 13,655 features from the
malware and benign samples encountered on Day 1 (1 Jan’14).
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Fig. 4: Cumulative number of features observed over time
for our large-scale dataset.
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Fig. 5: Benefits of using variable-feature sets over
fixed-feature sets.
The dimensionality grows quickly as we extract new sub-
graph features from samples encountered every day and while
reaching the final day (13 Aug’14), we have accumulated
1,653,496 features. This phenomenon of feature space growth
is common across many techniques including Drebin and
CSBD. This is because Android apps evolve over time for
various reasons such as capability enhancements, bug fixes,
using newly introduced Android functionalities and adapting
to changes in Android framework APIs [2, 7]. This evolution
results in newly observed characteristics which translate into
new features from a ML view point.
Now, we are posed with the question: should we consider
these new features that emerge every day? To address this, we
devise two types of training regimen, namely, variable feature-
set training and fixed feature-set training.
Fixed feature-set training regimen. Under the fixed feature-
set regimen, we train using a pre-determined set of features
for all evaluation days. That is, we fix the features to those
encountered up to Day 1, then we use those 13,655 features
for the whole experiment.
Variable feature-set training regimen. Under the variable
feature-set regimen, we allow the dimensionality of our PA
classifier to grow with the number of new features encoun-
tered; on the last day, for instance, we classify with more than
1.6 million features. Implicitly, examples that were introduced
before a feature i was first encountered will have value 0 for
feature i.
Fig. 5 shows the importance of using variable feature-
set training over fixed feature-set training. We see that the
performance for fixed feature regimen is significantly and
consistently inferior to the variable feature regimen. The latter
regimen has a 3.3% lesser cumulative error rate. This reveals
that, continuous retraining with a variable feature-set allows a
model to successfully adapt to new data and new features on a
sub-day granularity. This adaptiveness is critical to realize the
full benefits of online learning. This indicates that choosing the
right training regimen can be just as important as choosing the
right classifier. The aforementioned training regimens can help
online algorithms stay abreast of changing trends in malware
and benign apps’ features.
VII. UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE
In this section we seek to get deeper insights into the
superior performances of DroidOL’s online learning and to
understand how characteristics of the Android malware de-
tection task affects its performances. Specifically, we evaluate
and quantify the importance of long term memory and fast
model update. To this end, we pose the following question:
Why does DroidOL outperform batch-learning solutions in
detecting malware, even when they are re-trained?
Dataset. In order to provide insights into our results, we
need the notion of similarity among the malware samples.
More specifically, we need the malware to be grouped accord-
ing to their families. Malware familial analysis and grouping
is currently a manual process [2, 4]. It is impractical to
group apps from our large-scale dataset according to their
families. Hence we use a well-known benchmark dataset that
has malware readily grouped according to their family, namely,
Drebin5k6 [4]. Drebin5K contains a total of 5560 malicious
Android apps belonging to 179 malware families. The date of
creation of these samples lie in the range: Mar’09 to Oct’12.
Familial similarity and Notations. We now introduce the
notion of familial similarity between a pair of malicious apps.
We consider two malware m1 and m2 as variants, denoted by
m1 ∼ m2, if they belong to the same malware family. For
instance, Drebin5K dataset contains 965 samples belonging to
6In order to distinguish the dataset provided by Drebin authors from the
Drebin malware detection technique discussed in §VI, we refer to the dataset
as Drebin5K.
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Fig. 7: The Head CCDF of maximum variant distance in
Drebin5K dataset
the FakeInstaller family. We consider each of pair of them
as variants. This stems from the fact that malware belonging
to the same family exhibit similar malicious characteristics,
making them exhibit similar semantic features from a ML view
point.
Subsequently, for each malware m, set M contains all the
malware belonging to the same family as m. We calculate
the time difference between the creation of m and every
other malware, m′ ∈ M , denoted as 4(m,m′). We call the
minimum delay between another variant of the same family as
m as minimum variant delay, denoted by4min(m). Similarly,
we call the maximum delay between another variant of the
same family as m as maximum variant delay, denoted by
4max(m).
If there are no variants of for a malware m, its default values
for 4min(m) and 4max(m) are 0 and D, respectively, where
D is the difference between the date of creation of m and that
of the latest app in Drebin5K dataset.
Importance of fast model update. Fig. 6 depicts the head
of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the minimum
variant delay of the malware samples in the Drebin5K dataset.
It is clear that nearly 80% malware have a minimum variant
delay of zero days. Meaning, for a given malware sample, at
least one other variant of the same of family is built (and prob-
ably released) on the same day itself. This is understandable as
malware authors aim to maximize their gains by launching sev-
eral polymorphic variants of their malware, around the same
time, leveraging on techniques such as obfuscation. Hence in
order to keep abreast with quick-succession releases batch-
learning solutions have to be updated at least daily (ideally,
they have to be updated continuously). This explains why re-
training SVM/Drebin/CSBD solutions every day yields higher
classification accuracy in sections VI-A and VI-B. Therefore,
unless the detector is updated continuously to reflect the most
recent features present in the last malware, it will not be able
to effectively detect a majority of its variants.
Importance of long term memory. Fig. 7 depicts the
head of the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of the maximum variant delay of all the malware
samples in the Drebin5K dataset. We observe that more than
40% of malware have a maximum variant delay of more
than a year. Which means, a significant number of malware
families keep evolving for a few years. This is understandable
as malware authors make new variants either to evade known
detection techniques or to improve/enhance their attacks for a
prolonged period of time.
Therefore, if the batch size is limited to a few days or
months, these 40% of malware would not have many similar
variants in the batch. This leads to a significant reduction the
detection accuracy because the detection model, has not yet
learned enough on malware that is similar to these malware
by the time it needs to classify them. In general, Fig. 7
demonstrates that classifying malware require long term mem-
ory. This explains why extending SVM/Drebin/CSBD batch
sizes yielded better classification performance in sections
VI-A and VI-B. However, when using batch-learning based
detection solutions, the batch size is limited by the amount of
available memory. Particularly, for a problem such as Android
malware detection where we have millions of samples in a
year and typical ML solutions extracting thousands of features,
having a batch size of more than a year is not practical. On
the other hand, online learning algorithms do not have this
limitation. They retain significant useful information from all
of the malware that they have seen. In other words, online
algorithms operate with effectively infinite batch size. This
explains why they have an edge over batch-learning solutions
in our experiments.
Summary. From figures 6 and 7 it is clear that to perform
reasonably accurate and adaptive malware detection, the batch-
learning solutions should re-train every day with a batch size
of at least a year. This strategy is highly expensive in terms
of computation time and resources, rendering it impractical.
Hence, we can confidently conclude, online learning based
methods which do not have such computational limitations
and inherently adaptive are better suited for Android malware
detection.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present DroidOL, an accurate, adaptive and
scalable Android malware detection framework. DroidOL’s
unique feature is its ability to handle population drift in
Android malware through the use of online learning. DroidOL
exhibits high accuracy, as it extracts effective structural fea-
tures from apps using a state-of-the-art graph kernel. Further,
DroidOL adapts automatically to the drift in malware char-
acteristics over time and exhibits high scalability, making it
suitable for real-world malware detection.
Our large-scale evaluations on a real-world dataset demon-
strates that DroidOL outperforms state-of-the-art malware
detectors. DroidOL achieves 84.29% accuracy outperforming
existing techniques by more than 20% in their typical batch-
learning setting. This superior performance make DroidOL,
in particular, and online learning based solutions, in general,
better candidates for practical large-scale malware detection.
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